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Four scenarios of the static, non-cooperative game are simulated: a) Duopsony, i=2 and 
selected values of the transport rate in t∈[0,5];  b) Oligopsony: as a) but t=2.0 and 
i={2,3,4,5,6}; c) Unbounded space: as b) but region is a torus (e.g., x=0 is direct neighbor 
of xmax); and d) Inelastic supply: as c) but unit supply instead of linear supply functions. 
Results are presented by two density plots of the processor’s four decision variables: 
location (x,y) and price strategy (m,β). The brighter a point in the x-y or m-β plane the 
more frequent this combination is observed as the outcome of the game. 
Introduction
Agricultural markets often feature significant transport costs and spatially distributed 
production and processing (Figure 1) which causes spatial imperfect competition [1,2]. 
Spatial economics (as a theoretical framework to investigate those markets) considers the 
firms’ decisions regarding location and spatial price strategy separately, usually on the 
demand side, and under restrictive assumptions. Therefore, alternative approaches are 
needed to explain, e.g., the location of new ethanol plants (Figure 1) at peripheral as well 
as at central locations and the observation of different spatial price strategies in the market 
[3].
Methodology
An agent-based simulation model of spatially interacting input producers and processors is 
used. Producers are price taker and exhibit a linear, isoelastic supply function. There are 
400 uniformly distributed producers in a two-dimensional bounded region (x-y plane) of 
constant size. Processors identify the optimal location and price strategy via numerical 
simulations. The price strategy is a linear price distance function [4]: p(r)=m-(1-β)tr. The 
local price p(r) consists of the processor’s mill price m (the price at the processor’s 
location) less some portion 1-β of the transport costs t*r to location r with t being the 
constant transport rate. β∈[0,1] is the degree of spatial price discrimination (β=0: free-on-
board (FOB); β=1: uniform delivered (UD) pricing). The number of processors is i. The 
output price of the processed input is normalized (Æm∈[0,1]). 
Objectives
 Analyzing location and spatial pricing in a general model under multi-firm competition, 
two-dimensional space, and a continuum of potential price strategies
 Determining the effect of crucial assumptions on the model’s outcome 
 Linking spatial differentiation and spatial price discrimination to support theoretical model 
development and to explain real world observations
Figure 1:  U.S. Corn production and 
location of ethanol plants 2008
The market becomes more competitive with increasing number of firms. Processors 
seek equidistant locations. If this is not possible, we observe both differentiation in the 
processors’ location and price strategies (i=3). Thereby, higher price discrimination 
relates to locations of fierce competition. 
The lack of borders enables equidistant locations in most cases. Multiple equilibria arise 
(feasible constellations are highlighted). Only if i=6, the algorithm is not able to solve the 
coordination problem. Price discrimination increases with increasing competition.
Only if i=2 pure strategy equilibria in location can be observed. Unit supply yields high 
price discrimination (in terms of UD pricing). Increasing competition forces processor to 
pay more than the producer’s reservation price (which is set to zero).
If t=0.0, perfect or Bertrand competition (m=1) occurs because neither the location nor β
influence local prices. For high market competitiveness (t=1.0) minimum differentiation 
and low price discrimination (close to FOB pricing) is observed. With increasing transport 
costs spatial differentiation (two location equilibria) and price discrimination increases.
Conclusion
 The simulation enables the analysis of pricing and location under a general spatial competition framework.
 Results are consistent with theoretical findings and real world observations, e.g., in the case of ethanol 
production.
 Depending on the location of a processor, different price strategies can be observed. 
 Market competitiveness increases with the number of firms or lower transport costs. In the latter (former) 
case price discrimination decreases (increases) if the market is bounded (unbounded).
 Elasticity in the producers’ supply functions is identified as stabilizing factor of processor’s location.
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